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We study the factors that, arguably, affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between structured 
finance (SF), either project finance (PF) loans or asset securitization (AS) bonds, and straight debt finance 
(SDF) – corporate bonds (CB) – transactions using a large cross section of 24,435 Western European 
loans and bonds issued between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. 
Borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing and when they operate in a 
country with lower sovereign rating. Findings suggest that industrials, utilities, transportation, and 
governmental borrowers exhibit a higher likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically, a PF 
transaction. Several macroeconomic factors, like market interest rate levels and volatility, and the slope of 
the Euro swap curve, positively influence the probability of observing an SF over an SDF transaction. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis decrease the probability 
of observing an AS transaction. During the crisis, macroeconomic factors seem to significantly influence 
the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. 
We also find that credit spreads and loan to value ratios have a significant negative relationship for AS 
bonds. Overall, findings are in line with security design literature. SF transactions or instruments, based 
on extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with 
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Abstract 
We study the factors that, arguably, affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between structured 
finance (SF), either project finance (PF) loans or asset securitization (AS) bonds, and straight debt finance 
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transaction. Several macroeconomic factors, like market interest rate levels and volatility, and the slope of 
the Euro swap curve, positively influence the probability of observing an SF over an SDF transaction. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis decrease the probability 
of observing an AS transaction. During the crisis, macroeconomic factors seem to significantly influence 
the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. 
We also find that credit spreads and loan to value ratios have a significant negative relationship for AS 
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Structured finance (SF) transactions, either in the form of project finance or asset securitization 
structures, are financial transactions designed to meet, as closely as possible, the different requirements 
and needs of borrowers and investors. This paper aims to enlighten some of the main determinants of 
issuers selecting SF versus straight debt finance (SDF) transactions. Despite the important insightful 
predictions provided by security design models, firms’ financing structure decisions still remain 
unsatisfactorily explained, mainly (i) in terms of SF transactions, and (ii) with respect to the motivation 
for the firms to decide resorting to SF as opposed to straight debt. One possible explanation is that extant 
security design theories do not simultaneously and dynamically endogenize all contractual features. 
Finally, the suggested link between SF and the turmoil of the financial markets makes the analysis of the 
determinants of choosing an SF transaction versus an SDF transaction particularly interesting and relevant 
at both the theoretical and practical levels. 
In an economy à la Modigliani and Miller’s (1958),
1
 SF transactions would not matter. However, 
as argued in Miller (1988) “showing what doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does” 
(emphasis in the original). Therefore, and recognizing that firms’ debt and equity are, de facto, asset-
backed securities, M&M’s irrelevance theorem can play a fundamental role within an SF framework. In a 
world of perfectly competitive, liquid and frictionless financial markets, where market participants have 
homogeneous expectations, tranching,
2
 or the act of encapsulating an initiative or a pool of assets in an ad 
hoc organization,
3
 would not add value and a firm’s financing structure would be irrelevant. Thus, the 
existence of market imperfections and frictions, including asymmetric information problems, agency 
conflicts, and market and contract incompleteness, can explain tranching, ‘off-balance sheet financing’, 
and the benefits of SF instruments. In this framework, structured financing may matter, because it, 
arguably, may create value by minimizing the net costs associated with market imperfections. 
Despite the economic benefits for sponsors and investors, SF transactions may also have 
disadvantages, especially when used inappropriately. There is broad consensus about the non-negligible 
role played by SF transactions, especially asset securitizations, in the development and propagation of the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Typically, a highly asset 
securitization structured instrument exhibit a superior level of aggregated informational opacity, than the 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter M&M. 
2
 Tranching means the creation of multiple types of securities backed by the firm’s (or by the underlying asset pool, 
when considering securitization) assets and is considered one of the most important features that distinguishes SF 
instruments from traditional debt products. See, e.g., DeMarzo (2005) for further details. 
3
 A key feature of SF transactions, which differentiates them from other financing arrangements, is the presence of a 
separate vehicle company, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity (SPE), incorporated to initiate 
the deal, and to secure cash receipts and the resulting payments. 
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individual assets included in the SPV’s asset pool, thereby worsening informational asymmetries among 
market participants, and therefore increasing the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
A firm’s rational value maximizer manager / owner should choose between SF or SDF financing, 
based on the cost of capital efficiency of the available financing alternatives. For example, the decision 
either to go with a project finance transaction or with an SDF, should be based on the trade-off between 
the composite cost of capital of the project finance and the sponsor’s, and the sponsor’s overall cost of 
capital after the SDF. Thus, one first question is raised concerning the choice between SF and SDF 
transactions: What factors determine the managerial choice between these financing alternatives? 
The fact that firms issue securities other than debt and equity, and the recurrent introduction of 
new and more complex securities, raises one second question: ‘What are the more efficient securities a 
firm should optimally issue? The paper also aims answering this question focusing on the choice between 
SF and SDF instruments. 
To empirically trying to answer these questions, we use a comprehensive sample of SF – project 
finance (PF) loans and asset securitization (AS) bonds – and SDF – corporate bonds (CB) – transactions 
issued in Western European countries between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. Our sample 
contains information about 2,859 PF tranches (worth Euro 332.1 billion), 599 AS issues (worth Euro 
179.1 billion), and 20,977 CB issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion).We aim at determining what affects the 
probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF transactions, and also between a PF loan 
and an AS bond or between an AS bond and a CB. 
Looking at the estimation of the selection equation in model [1], our empirical findings indicate 
that: (i) the effect of lower tranche size increases the probability of selecting an SF transaction, rather than 
an SDF transaction; (ii) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing, and when 
they operate in a country with higher credit risk; (iii) borrowers in industrial, utilities, transportation and 
government areas increase the likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically a PF transaction; (iv) the 
probability of observing an AS bond issue increases if the borrower belongs to the financial industry; (v) 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreases the probability of observing an AS transaction; (vi) 
macroeconomic factors, like the level of the interest rates, market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap 
curve, and credit accessibility positively influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond; and 
(vii) the market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility have proven to be 
irrelevant in the process of making a choice between PF loans and AS bonds. 
For testing the robustness of our results, we split the sample in: (i) a pre-crisis sub-sample, from 
January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008; and (ii) a crisis sub-sample, from September 15
th
, 2008 
through to December 31
st
, 2011. Results show a statistically significant increase, of 572.93 bps, in SF’s 
credit spreads between the two sub-sampling periods. Additionally, splitting our sample does not bias the 
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main conclusions regarding microeconomic variables, in line with the results of the overall sampling 
period, what indicates that our results are robust in this dimension. However, robustness tests of 
macroeconomic factors, like the interest rate levels, the market volatility, and the Euro swap curve slope, 
document that the pre-crisis sub-sample results are not statistically significant.  
This paper contributes to extant literature in different ways. The first, because, to the best of our 
knowledge, it may be the first to look at the financing choices between SF and SDF transactions. The 
paper contributes to 2007-2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis 
literature. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis significantly 
impacted the choice between these two types of financing transactions. We find that credit rating is the 
most important pricing factor for AS bonds at issue. This fact may be a consequence of investors’ 
extensive reliance on credit ratings because of the innate informational complexity of securitization 
structures. The paper also contributes to the corporate financial economics literature, by improving the 
understanding of what the boundaries of firms are and new insights on the industrial organization 
economics. The nature of the firm as a nexus of contracts is even more apparent in SF than in SDF 
settings. In PF and AS, a specially incorporated new firm (SPV) is created to manage all contracts and to 
make cash flows more readily verifiable for lenders. In such cases, it is crucial to design financial 
contracts with the objective of pre-committing, whenever possible, the possible behavior of the SPV 
management. Careful contract design prevents agency problems between SPV sponsoring firms and 
lenders, and establishes an effective risk management framework. Pre-committing future obligations also 
reduces the volatility of cash flows available for debt service. 
The paper distinguishes from prior research because: (i) no full-scale empirical study of the 
choice between SF and SDF transactions has yet been published – we overcome this gap by 
simultaneously using DealScan and DCM Analytics databases; (ii) in order to test the expected impact on 
the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following 
Heckman (1979); and (iii) the sampling period covers a pre-crisis period, from January 1
st
, 2000 through 
to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period, from September 15
th
, 2008 through to December 31
st
, 2011. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the security 
design theoretical and empirical background, and the interconnections with SF literature. Section 3 
describes the DealScan and DCM Analytics databases used in this study. The basic characteristics of the 
samples of SF versus SDF transactions are also presented here. In section 4, the organization choice 
models are discussed and applied. The factors that influence the choice of an SF transaction instead of an 




2. Security Design and Structured Finance 
2.1. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
The literature on security design is quite extensive. Its comprehensive survey is well beyond the 
scope of this work. Instead, we parsimoniously review the mainstream financial structure literature 
highlighting the more relevant contributions to identify the economic factors that, arguably, may underlie 
the origination of structured finance transactions. 
It is well understood that under conditions of complete, perfect and frictionless markets, and 
complete contracting, the firm’s financing choices are irrelevant in terms of its market value, and in terms 
of the welfare of its security holders (M&M).
4
 By implication, the specific type and features of the 
financing contractual arrangement are also irrelevant. Therefore, the debt or equity contracts under which 
investors supply funds to the firm, are optimal financial contracting arrangements.
5
 
In real-world market economies, markets are incomplete and plagued with imperfections and 
frictions, and contracts are incomplete, though.
6
 In this environment a firm’s financing policy does 
matter.
7
 However, theoretically it is still not well understood why actual real world firms’ financing 
contracts, recurrently appear in certain patterns [e.g., Harris and Raviv (1989)]. This suggests that it is 
needed a more robust theoretical framework to help explaining the financing decision-making of those 
firms, namely in terms of security design.
8
 
The notion that a firm can be conceptualized as a nexus of contracts is a particularly powerful and 
helpful framework to rationalize the corporate financial structure.
9
 In a nexus of contracts setting, 
ownership rights play a central role in analyzing contractual relationships [Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Stiglitz (1989), and Hart and Moore (1990)]. The specification of such individual ownership rights 
requires contracting the allocation of both residual rights of control, and residual rents [e.g., Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992)]. The importance of residual control rights derives from the difficulty of writing complete 
                                                 
4
 If a contract could be costlessly written, laying down each party’s obligations and payoffs for any conceivable 
eventuality in every possible future state of the world, then any contracting problems would not emerge. 
5
 M&M irrelevance theorem was extended and generalized under less stringent assumptions, including the presence 
of risky debt and hybrid securities, the relaxation of the risk class assumption, and assuming intertemporal settings 
[see Stiglitz (1969, 1974), Smith (1972), Baron (1974, 1976), Merton (1974), and Hellwig (1981)]. 
6
 Among the problems associated with market imperfections and frictions, and contracts incompleteness are: (i) the 
imperfect observability of agent’s actions; and (ii) the costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts. 
7
 As argued by Stiglitz (1989) “we cannot simultaneously hold to the view that firms are rational profit maximizing 
(shareholders are rational investors) and that debt-equity ratios (and financial policies more generally) are 
irrelevant”. 
8
 As pointed out by Allen and Gale (1988) “to develop a theory of optimal security design, it is clearly necessary to 
develop a framework in which markets are incomplete.” 
9
 Coase (1937) pioneered the ‘nexus of contracts’ framework. It received so widespread support [e.g., Alchien and 
Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Milgrom and Roberts (1992)] that Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) 





 Therefore, the uncertainty inherent to incomplete contracts is potentially a source for 
opportunistic behavior of the contracting parties [Bolton and Scharfstein (1998)].
11
 
Within this literature, Allen and Winton (1995) argue that the security design theoretical 
framework provides a promising foundation to examine the derivation of efficient financial contracts as 
mechanisms to optimally align the interests of the contracting parties.  
The observation of real world firms’ financing behavior shows that their financing patterns tend 
to vary cross-sectionally and over time, within apparently homogeneous industries, and even when 
markets, institutions, regulation and taxations seem apparently invariant. Despite the remarkable diversity 
of available financing alternatives, continued security design innovation still seems to be a prolific source 
of new tailor-made security arrangements and contractual designs for the corporate financing world. 
Structured finance instruments are commonly mentioned as one group of newly introduced instruments 
resulting from innovation activities in security and contractual design.
12
 
The appeal of structured finance instruments is contingent on the trade-off between the costs for 
the borrower in designing and structuring a new instrument, and the benefits they offer to investors or 
lenders. Among the sources of value creation identified in the extant structured finance literature, are 
included: (i) risk reallocation / yield reduction – risks are transferred from those who are less willing to 
bear it to those who are more willing to bear it (e.g., collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and 
stripped mortgage-backed securities – AS); (ii) agency costs mitigation – capital structure must be 
engineered to accommodate the risk-return preferences of the various classes of investors lowering 
potential agency costs (e.g., PF and leveraged buyouts); (iii) reduced issuance costs (e.g., AS); and (iv) 
tax arbitrage (e.g., structured leases) [e.g., Finnerty (1988)]. 
2.1.1. The Economics of Structured Finance 
Structured finance is related to the design of financial instruments based on the use of contracting 
tools and mechanisms to meet, as closely as possible, the requirements and needs of the originator or 
owner of an asset (or pool of assets) and investors’ expected requirements. Thus, SF encompasses all 
financial arrangements helping to efficiently (re)finance a specified pool of assets beyond the scope of on-
balance sheet financing [Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst 
(2007)]. 
                                                 
10
 Williamson (1990) argues that in a bounded rationality world “all complex contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete.” 
11
 According to Hart (1988), Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson should be credited for the “insight that the firm 
as an institution takes on importance only in a world of incomplete contracts.” See Tirole (1999), Hart and Moore 
(1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Aghion and Bolton (1992), for rigorous discussions on incomplete contracts.  
12
 Finnerty (1988) suggests that leveraged buyout structuring, corporate restructuring, and project 
finance/lease/asset-based financial structuring are relevant examples of financial innovation. 
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In an SF transaction, the requirements of the owner of the assets or cash flows refer to liquidity, 
funding, risk transfer, efficient risk allocation, favorable capital, tax and accounting treatment, or other 
needs. Instruments are usually designed, namely in terms of covenants, warrantees, corporate structure, 
contracts, and trusts, to achieve segregation of those assets or cash flows from the originator or sponsor of 
the transaction. Additionally, credit enhancement mechanisms are implemented (e.g., the use of 
warrantees to enhance recoveries and tranching to define risk attachment points). In brief, there are three 
main specificities of SF. First, the critical role played by the vehicle company; i.e., the recipient of the 
raised funds is a separate entity from the party or parties sponsoring the transaction, which plays an 
important role in the segmentation of cash flows and risks in a form proving more attractive for investors, 
through a structuring process.
13
 Secondly, the high level of leverage, and finally, the centrality of 
prospective cash flow in order to evaluate the feasibility of the operation.  
Prior research has identified the following main categories of SF transactions: (i) asset 
securitization;
14
 (ii) project finance;
15
 (iii) structured leasing;
16
 and (iv) leveraged acquisitions, namely 
Leveraged Buy-Outs (LBOs)
17
 [Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), 
Gorton and Souleles (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. 
To analyze the motivations for using SF instruments, first and foremost it is crucial to understand 
why they create value. SF can create value by reducing the net costs associated with market 
imperfections. The literature on SF, suggests several economic motivations for originating a financing 
transaction under a structured model.
18
 First, it enables the financing of a unique asset class that (i) 
previously may have been financed only by traditional borrowing methods; or (ii) could not be financed at 
all without SF. SF thus plays a critical role as a new and diverse source of funding. The second economic 
benefit lies in cost reduction, when the benefits of the reduced cost of funding are greater than the cost of 
the required credit enhancement. The third advantage refers to maintaining the sponsors’ financial 
flexibility by creating vehicle companies (SPVs) designated to take on the initiative, helping sponsors to 
                                                 
13
 For similar viewpoint see Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), Akbiyikli et al. (2006), Fabozzi et al. (2006), 
and Leland (2007). 
14
 Securitization typically includes Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(RMBS), Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), and Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP). For further details see, e.g., Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), 
Kothari (2006), Jobst (2007), Tavakoli (2008), Krebsz (2011), Gorton and Metrick (2013), and references therein. 
15
 For further discussion see, e.g., Brealey et al. (1996), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Esty (2004a, 2004b, 
2007), Gatti (2005, 2008), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), and references therein.  
16
 For a comprehensive account of theoretical and empirical literature on structured leasing see, among others, 
Slovin et al. (1990), Caselli (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Deo (2009). 
17
 For further discussion see, e.g., Weston et al. (2001), Arzac (2005), Capizzi (2005), Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009), Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009), and Guo et al. (2011). 
18
 See, among others, Esty (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), DeMarzo (2005), Fender and Mitchell (2005), Akbiyikli 
et al. (2006), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Tavakoli (2008), and Gorton and Metrick (2013). 
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protect their own credit standing and future access to financial markets, by improving or maintaining 
financial and regulatory ratios. Additionally, SF transactions allow originators or sponsors to transfer the 
risk of assets or liabilities and to carry out additional business without expanding their balance sheet. SF 
also contributes to improving operational and informational market efficiency, reducing agency costs, and 
reducing information asymmetries. Finally, it also allows the issuer to leverage up, compared to senior 
unsecured debt, and to increase tax shields/savings. 
Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits for sponsors and investors, SF transactions 
also have disadvantages, especially when used inappropriately. SF transactions are fairly complex and 
involve a significant amount of cash flow evaluation, due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. 
Consequently, structuring such a deal is more costly than corporate financing. Moreover, it can be said 
that there is a broad consensus that securitization played an important role in the development and 
propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
19
 One can thus identify the following problems related to 
the use of SF transactions: (i) complexity; (ii) off-balance sheet treatment; (iii) asymmetric information 
problems; (iv) agency problems; (v) higher transaction costs; and (vi) wealth expropriation.
20
 
The credit crunch triggered by the 2007-2008 financial crisis has somewhat tarnished the 
previously prevailing positive image of securitization, as a process to help remedy deficiencies in 
financial markets, arising from incomplete capital allocation. Besides the fact that AS instruments are 
complex vis-à-vis SDF transactions, two major problems are commonly pointed out, underlying the roots 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis: (i) asymmetric information problems; and (ii) agency problems. The 
increased complexity of structured instruments related to securitization, such as CDOs, squared CDOs, 
and even more complex securities, destroyed information, thereby making asymmetric information worse 
in the financial system and increasing the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Additionally, the originate-to-distribute business model, which lay behind the subprime mortgage market, 
was subject to the principal-agent problem. Several authors argue that securitization lead to a severe 
principal-agent problem where the firm, who originates the assets to be ultimately sold and securitized, 
retains little or no interest in the pool of securitized assets. In this case, the originator does not have the 
same incentive to pay attention to the creditworthiness of its customers, as would be the case when the 
assets remain on its balance sheet. This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) and Jobst 
(2006, 2009), who argue that market failures stemming from conflicts of interest in the securitization 
process played a major role in the 2007-2008 crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 See, among others, IMF (2008), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), and Brunnermeier (2009). 
20
 See, e.g., Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Gorton (2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2013). 
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2.1.2. The Design of Structured Finance Transactions 
A considerable number of new financial instruments are routinely brought to the market. Thus, an 
interesting question to ask is whether or not the design of new securities matters, and if yes, why is it? 
There is a broad agreement that in a complete contracting environment security design is irrelevant. 
Therefore, it is possible to design and write an ex-ante incentive contract to induce the agent to act in the 
principal’s best interest. Harris and Raviv (1989) argue that security design is a tool for resolving conflict 
of interest between contestants for control and outside investors and for maximizing firm value. This 
sheds light on designing optimal securities, and on the development of SF instruments. Allen and Gale 
(1988) suggest that successful SF instruments allocate cash flows to the investors who value them the 
most, allowing securities to be held in their most efficient form. Summarizing, SF research should focus 
on market imperfections to understand the design of SF transactions. 
Optimal contractual arrangements derived in the financial contracting literature are mechanisms 
used to resolve different types of conflicts of interest or asymmetric information problems that arise in 
agency relationships between economic agents,
21
 such as entrepreneurs and financiers; i.e., the research 
on optimal contracting allows understanding in which situations securities are optimal responses to capital 
market imperfections [Sannikov (2013)]. Most of the research carried out on the formal study of financial 
contracting has been developed along the main argument to be resolved by endogenous contract 
determination. From this perspective, the literature can be classified based on a relatively stable taxonomy 
[Allen and Winton (1995), and Harris and Raviv (1995)]. 
The first group of models – allocation of cash flow rights in agency conflicts – views financial 
contracts as mechanisms to efficiently align the interests of entrepreneurs with outside investors. In these 
models, insiders presumably have the ability to appropriate (at least partially) project’s income, and have 
access to private benefits of control. Under these conditions, it has been shown that the debt contract is 
the only optimal contract when lenders cannot observe borrowers’ income without costs.
22
 In this class of 
models, ‘equity’ is entirely owned by the entrepreneur (insiders), and all external financing is raised under 
the form of debt contracts.
23
 Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwing (1985), Williamson (1986, 1987), and 
Boyd and Smith (1994) developed a model where costly verification of project outcomes can be done 
stochastically. In such a case, they showed that standard debt contracts are almost optimal contracts. 
Lacker (1990) generalized Diamond’s model and showed that, when a borrower holds an asset with a 
higher marginal utility for the borrower than for the lender, a debt contract collateralized by this asset 
                                                 
21
 These include: (i) shirking; (ii) over-consumption of firm’s resources; (iii) diverting cash flow; (iv) claim dilution; 
(v) asset substitution; (vi) adopting suboptimal investment policies; and (vii) risk shifting. 
22
 See, e.g., Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000). 
23
 See, e.g., Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Lacker (1990), Winton (1995), and Hart 
and Moore (1998). 
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(e.g., home mortgages, car loans, or loans backed by a new business’ assets) is optimal.
24
 In Winton 
(1995), when the borrower can borrow from multiple investors he prefers to issue debt-like contracts with 
varying degrees of seniority rather than symmetric debt-like contracts – assigning different levels of 
seniority to different investors reduces the duplication of verification costs. Winton’s model can be 
applied to explain some features of SF transactions. In a Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) many classes of debt 
and preferred stock are typically issued, and the most junior claims are held by management and a buyout 
fund that monitors management closely. The second application is AS, where relatively small financial 
claims are pooled by an intermediary and then refinanced. In securitization, two or more tranches are 
issued with different degrees of seniority among investors, the originating institution typically agrees to 
buy the tranche’s ‘first loss’,
25
 and ‘credit enhancement’ is often provided by a third-party who provides 
coverage for additional losses up to a fixed amount. 
The models developed into the second set of theories are driven by adverse selection 
considerations – allocation of cash flow rights in adverse selection environments. At this point, securities 
are designed to signal borrower’s private information to lenders. Among others, Allen and Gale (1992), 
De and Kale (1993), and Nachman and Noe (1994) show that, with adverse selection, non-contingent 
securities, like standard debt, are optimal contracts. An early stream of this literature is driven by the 
impact of market imperfections and the economic characteristics of firms concerning their choice of debt 
maturity. It is mainly concerned with the effects of market frictions and imperfections, such as transaction 
costs, taxes, and interest rate risk on firms’ debt maturity decisions. When the information about the true 
quality of a firm’s assets is asymmetrically distributed between insiders and outsiders, financing decisions 
at large, and short-term debt issues in particular, may be perceived by market participants as signaling 
firm asset quality as suggested in, e.g., Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991). In this framework, there 
may be a potential advantage for short-term debt [Myers (1977)]. In 1993 Diamond developed a model in 
which a firm’s manager can choose debt seniority, as well as maturity. It shows that (i) short-term debt is 
optimal when it is senior; (ii) long-term debt is optimal when it is junior; and (iii) long-term debt is 
optimal when it allows the issuance of additional senior short-term debt at the interim date. 
The third group relates to the role of securities in the allocation of ownership and control rights.
26
 
If both parties in a financing arrangement could write a contract without costs, contingent upon all 
possible states of the world, and lawfully enforceable, then the allocation of power in such a contractual 
                                                 
24
 See, among others, Allen and Winton (1995). Hart and Moore (1995) also provide interesting results on how 
different levels of seniority of debt contract can mitigate agency problems. 
25
 This means that the originator takes all credit losses up to a certain percentage of assets’ value. First loss tranche 
is also called equity, residual or junior tranche. 
26
 See, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1989), Zender (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and 
Hart and Moore (1994). 
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relationship would be irrelevant. Additionally, there would be little room for the exercise of ownership 
and control rights. In this case, all relevant decisions would be made ex-ante. Aghion and Bolton (1992) 
examine a project’s long-term financing in an incomplete contracting framework [along the lines of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)]. An important result of their analysis concerns the 
implications of the standard debt contract in terms of the optimal (contingent) allocation of control rights. 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Zender (1991) show that contracts with contingent transfer of control 
rights may minimize inefficiencies, which provides a rationale for standard debt contracts. 
In the fourth group of models, securities are designed to optimize the information that investors 
have – acquisition of information.
27
 It is widely accepted that the volume of information held by investors 
affects the value of a security. Thus, securities can be designed to affect the extent to which information is 
acquired in order to maximize value. In this line of reasoning, Boot and Thakor (1993) developed a model 
where a firm issues securities to investors who have to pay to become informed on the firms’ value. 
Similarly, Diamond (1993), Winton (1995), and Glaeser and Kallal (1997) argue that the design and 
issuance of different classes of securities with different degrees of seniority – structuring – reduces 
monitoring costs. Boot and Thakor (1993) and Riddiough (1997) show that a financial institution wishing 
to raise funds in the presence of asymmetric information can increase revenue by pooling assets and 
issuing different types of securities against the pool of cash flow. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) developed 
a model akin to Boot and Thakor (1993) and argue that, considering the design of asset-backed securities, 
the optimal tranche is the senior one and the issuer retains the first loss tranche and any unsold fraction of 
the senior tranche. DeMarzo (2005) extends DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1999) model and concludes that 
pooling and tranching allow intermediaries to leverage their capital more efficiently, enhancing the 
returns to their private information. An extension of the Boot and Thakor (1993) model is formulated by 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1997) in which they analyze the effect of information acquisition on the design of 
securities like collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). They show that marginal cash flows should be 
allocated to one security or another rather than split between securities. In Rajan and Winton (1995), 
attention turns to covenants and collateral as common features of loans made by financial institutions. 
They investigate how loans can be structured to enhance the institutions’ incentives to monitor. 
The fifth category includes models representing the allocation of risk among the different kinds of 
investors.
28
 Several authors have studied this issue based on transaction costs as a source of market 
incompleteness. Allen and Gale (1988) developed a perfectly competitive, symmetric information model, 
where there are transaction costs and concluded that the price of a security is determined by the group that 
values it most. Pesendorfer (1995) formulated a model related to Ross (1989) and introduced financial 
                                                 
27
 See, e.g., Boot and Thakor (1993) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1997). 
28
 See, e.g., Allen and Gale (1988, 1991, 1994), and Pesendorfer (1995). 
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innovation. He showed that (i) innovation can improve agents’ utilities by reducing costs of marketing; 
(ii) the level of innovation is not necessarily constrained efficiently; and (iii) innovation eliminates 
indeterminacy observed in other models. An approach to security design is developed by Allen and Gale 
(1991), who assume an environment in which the set of traded securities is endogenous and investors are 
permitted to undertake unlimited short sales. In this environment, and contrary to Allen and Gale (1988) 
where short selling is severely limited, equilibrium emerges. Allen and Gale (1988, 1991, and 1994) 
argue that, in AS, these restrictions can provide arbitrage value because two portfolios of securities 
paying the same amount may have different prices. Considering the optimal security design problem, 
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) argue that in securitization the originator may prefer to issue a security with 
‘high information sensitivity’ if he intends to maintain a residual equity position in the pool of assets.
29
 
Using optimal risk allocation models, Benveniste and Berger (1987) and James (1988) show that 
securitization can improve risk sharing and increase project funding by avoiding the Myers (1977) 
underinvestment problem. 
The literature to date does not provide much insight into the actual path of most financial 
innovations and SF products. Although all models yield a number of important insightful predictions, 
firms’ financial and financing structures decisions still remain unsatisfactorily explained, mainly (i) in 
terms of SF transactions, and (ii) with respect to the reason why firms decide to use SF instead of 
common debt. One possible explanation is that existing security design theories do not simultaneously 
and dynamically endogenize all contractual features. 
 
3. Data Description 
3.1. DealScan and DCM Analytics databases 
Our sample consists of individual loans and bond offers extracted from DealScan and DCM 
Analytics databases, respectively. DCM Analytics database is compiled by Dealogic and offers 
comprehensive information of debt securities issued on the debt capital markets. DealScan database is 
provided by Thomson Reuters LPC, a market information provider of individual deal information on the 
global syndicated loan markets. We use these two databases because we require information about the 
pricing characteristics of SF and SDF transactions. While DCM Analytics provides information regarding 
CB – used as a proxy for SDF transactions – and AS, DealScan provides information concerning PF loans 
– we use AS and PF transactions as proxies for SF instruments. 
We study the factors that affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF 
transactions using a large cross section of Western European loans and bonds issued between January 1
st
, 
                                                 
29
 In such cases, the originator signals their incentives to monitor by maintaining an equity position. 
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2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. Although the database extracted from DCM Analytics contains 
information on several types of bonds, we include only those with a deal type code of “corporate bond-
investment-grade”, “corporate bond-high yield”, “asset-backed security” (ABS), and “mortgage-backed 
security” (MBS).
30
 Bond tranches classified either as fixed rate bonds, with coupon rate information, or 
variable rate bonds, with both spread and index information were included in the data. While DealScan 
database contains historical information about syndicated loans and related banking instruments, we 
examine only loans with a deal specific purpose code of “project finance”. We also require, for both 
databases, that the Borrower/Issuer country belongs to Western Europe and that the tranche size (in Euro 
millions) be available.
31
 After applying these screens, we are able to examine a total of 24,435 debt issues 
(worth Euro 6,297.8 billion). Our sample contains information on 599 AS issues (worth Euro 179.1 
billion) – of which 430 issues (worth Euro 106.3 billion) have a deal type code of ABS and 169 issues 
(worth Euro 72.9 billion) have a deal type code of MBS –, 20,977 CB issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion), 
and 2,859 PF issues (worth Euro 332.1 billion). We refer to this as our ‘full sample’. 
As the unit of observation is a single issue or a single loan tranche, multiple issues from the same 
transaction appear as separate observations in our database. PF and AS transactions typically consist of 
several tranches funding the same SPV. Therefore, we focus on the transaction tranches as our basic 
observation. 
Since we which to perform maximum likelihood estimations of our credit spread samples for our 
model specification, simultaneously with a probit selection equation where the probability of signing a 
loan or bond is a function of either micro and macro variables, we select from our full sample those issues 
that have complete data on credit spread. This screen has yielded a “high-information” sub-sample of 
12,080 loans [worth 4,962,996 Euro millions (M€)], of which 1,090 (worth 158,487 M€) have been 
classified as PF loans, AS bonds represent 439 issues (worth 140,733 M€), and 10,551 are CB issues 
(4,663,777 M€). Additionally, the data on macroeconomic variables (e.g., level of interest rates, market 
volatility, slope of the Euro swap rate)
32
 is obtained from DataStream. We linked the macroeconomic 
                                                 
30
 We exclude bond issues which have a deal type code of ‘Medium-Term Note’, ‘Non-Us Agency’, ‘Covered 
Bonds’, and ‘Collateralized-Debt Obligation’. Perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, 
caps, or floors were also excluded from the database. Due to the important role played by CDOs in the 2007-2008 
financial crisis – CDOs based on MBS linked to the subprime market were negatively affected inflicting enormous 
losses on investors – and as CDO issues are frequently backed by ABS and MBS, we decided to exclude CDOs from 
our AS dataset. 
31
 We consider the following countries as pertaining to Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Denmark; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Luxemburg; the Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. 
32
 We identified the possible variables to use as instruments for the credit spread based on the available literature [in 
particular, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), Vink and 
Thibeault (2008), Gatti el al. (2013), and Pinto et al. (2013)], and furthermore the opinions collected during verbal 
discussions with top investment banks confirms our choices. 
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variables and the microeconomic information contained in the loans (DealScan) and bonds (DCM 
Analytics) databases on the active date (PF loans) or issue date (AS and CB issues). 
3.2. Characteristics of Structured Finance versus Straight Debt Finance 
This section provides a statistical analysis of SF (PF and AS) versus SDF (CB) lending in 
Western Europe. We start by comparing the distribution of loans and bonds across time, industry, and 
nationality of the borrower/issuer. The financial characteristics of PF loans are compared with the sample 
of AS bonds, as well as with our CB sample. The distribution by year of PF, AS, and CB issues is 
described in Table 1. Table 2 presents the industrial distribution of the PF, AS, and CB issues, while 
Table 3 presents the geographic distribution of the facilities in each of these three samples. 
**** Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here **** 
Table 1 shows the evolution of PF, AS, and CB issues between 2000 and 2011. PF lending to 
Western Europe peaked in 2008 (by value and number), fell in 2009 and rose again in 2010. AS also 
peaked in 2008 and fell in 2009. After 2009, we do not have observations in our sample. This is partly 
explained by the European sovereign debt crisis, which has limited the increase of securitized products, 
but also by the fact that an increasing number of banks have underwritten their own securitization 
programs to use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the auctions of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), issuing the so-called Covered Bonds. These practices have partially replaced the issue of debt by 
banks or the interbank market itself as sources of finance. Finally, CB issues peaked in 2009 and since 
then have fallen. 
Table 2 reveals interesting differences between PF and AS, which largely confirm the standard 
picture of these two types of SF transactions. Table 2 shows that AS bonds are highly concentrated in one 
industry, whereas the general population of PF loans reveals a far less concentrated industrial pattern. 
75.1% of all AS bonds (by value) are issued by sponsors in the financial industry, while only 1.4% of PF 
lending goes to borrowers in this industry. PF lending is concentrated in four key industries; i.e., 
industrial (37.9%), utilities (31.1%), transportation (13.7%), and commercial (10.6%) industries account 
for 93.3% of all PF lending (value) and 93.7% of all PF loans. Similar results are presented by Kleimeier 
and Megginson (2000). Based on a sample of 4.956 PF loans booked on national and international 
markets from January 1
st
, 1980 through to March 23
rd
, 1999, they find that no less than 90.9% of all PF 
lending (by value) are made to borrowers in the Commercial & Industrial, Utilities, and Transportation 
industries.
33
 These industries account for only 24.9% of the total value – and 25.9% of the number – of 
AS bonds. This finding is consistent with the common wisdom that PF is used primarily to fund tangible-
                                                 
33
 Corielli et al. (2010) present similar results. Based on a sample of PF loans closed between January 1998 and May 
2003 they show that the largest share of loans was awarded to electricity/power and other energy utilities (about 
52% of the total value), followed by telecommunications (28%) and transportation (14%). 
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asset-rich and capital intensive projects, while AS is a form of financing where monetary assets with 
predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created third party that has borrowed money to 
finance the purchase. Conversely, a number of similarities can be established between AS and CB 
samples. As for AS, CB are highly concentrated in the financial institutions industry (67.2% of the total 
value and 80.8% of the total number). The most interesting difference can be observed in the industrial 
sector, which accounts for 13.2% of all corporate bond lending, almost double the fraction for AS (6.5%) 
– 8.6% of the total number versus 5.5% for AS. 
Table 3 also shows clear differences between the Western European countries which attract PF 
lending and those where AS and CB are directed. AS bonds are highly concentrated in three countries 
(89.5% by value and 77.0% of the total number of issues are made by borrowers located in U.K., 
Germany, and Italy), with the bulk number of issues concentrated in the U.K. (41.2% by value and 48.7% 
of all AS tranches). The general population of PF loans reveals a far less concentrated geographic pattern. 
No less than six countries concentrate 80.6% of the total value – and no less than 85.9% of the total 
number – of PF loans. Closer analysis reveals a similar pattern for CB issues, with the same six countries 
(Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) accounting for an identical fraction (81.7% of the 
total value of CB versus 80.6% of all PF lending). The biggest recipient of CB lending is Germany. This 
country accounts for 24.0% of the total value of CB issues (26.4% for AS bonds), whereas it accounts for 
a mere 5.8% of the value of all PF lending. Intriguingly, U.K. borrowers are less represented in the PF 
sub-sample than the Spanish borrowers (23.6% by value versus 28.0%). Considering the emphasis placed 
by U.K. governments on the Private Finance Initiative (PFI); i.e., on private rather than public financing 
of large public infrastructure projects, one would expect a greater fraction of U.K. borrowers in the total 
value of PF loans. 
Table 4 presents basic characteristics for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues. Significant 
differences are revealed between both SF and SDF issues, as well as between the two categories of SF 
issues. One of the most remarkable findings is how much larger AS and CB tranches are than PF 
tranches. These issues have mean values of 299 M€ and 276 M€, respectively, compared with 116 M€ for 
PF issues. Thus, as regards tranche size, AS securities are similar to SDF securities. This can be explained 
by the fact that both transactions involve the offer of securities in the capital markets, while syndicated 
loans are the prominent form of funding for project-financed investments. 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
According to the average maturity (years) variable, the three types of loans are substantially 
different financing instruments. The average maturity of PF loans, 13.6 years, is significantly lower that 
of the AS bonds full sample (20.9 years), but considerably longer than that of the CB full sample (5.3 
years). Additionally, compared to AS and CB samples, PF loans involve more than the number of twice 
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banks in the transaction. Further, AS and CB transactions are more likely to be exposed to currency risk 
when compared to the PF full sample. 
The most remarkable similarity between SF instruments is how frequently PF loans and AS bonds 
are issued with guarantees (96.9% and 100%, respectively). This largely meets the standard 
characteristics of PF and AS. Contrary to the traditional CB, where it is the ability of the issuer to 
generate sufficient cash flows to repay the debt obligation that determines the risks of the transaction, in 
AS the source of repayments shift from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows generated by the 
securitized assets and/or a third party guarantor, in case of default. In a PF transaction, the financing is 
structured with as little recourse as possible to the sponsor, while at the same time providing sufficient 
credit support through guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor or third party, so that lenders will be 
satisfied with the credit risk. 
Finally, AS and CB issues are frequently extended to financial institutions, with 74.1% of AS 
tranches and 80.8% of CB tranches issued by borrowers in this industry. As expected, only 0.43% of all 
PF loans are issued by sponsors in the financial institutions industry. 
 
4. The Financing Choice 
When comparing the values of credit spread in AS bonds, PF loans, and CB issues high-
information samples – loans and bonds that have complete data on credit spread – we conclude that PF 
loans are a more expensive type of financing than CB and even than AS bonds. On the contrary, average 
credit spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly.
34
 Our findings diverge from those 
presented by Hu and Cantor (2006), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), and Maris and Segal (2002). Hu 
and Cantor (2006) and Maris and Segal (2002) state that AS securities credit spreads have been higher 
than CB credit spreads. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) point out that floating-rate PF loans have lower 
credit spreads than do most comparable non-PF loans. We also conclude that PF issues have lower credit 
rating and a higher number of banks involved. Our full samples also reveal that SF loans and bonds have 
lower loan to value ratios than SDF issues and have longer time to maturity. 
These observations are ex post in nature. They do, however, lead to a question concerning the 
choice between SF and SDF transactions and even between PF loans and AS bonds: What factors 
determine the managerial choice between these financing alternatives? In order to answer this question, 
the effects of each of the two financing approaches on the overall cost of financing have to be clear. For 
example, the decision either to go with a PF transaction or with a CB, should be based on the trade-off 
                                                 
34
 We have run t-tests comparing the values of each variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding values 
in the PF loan full sample; the values of each variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding values in the 
CB full sample; and the values of each variable in PF loan full sample with the corresponding values in the CB full 
sample. In the interest of space we do not show the results of these tests. The results are available from the authors. 
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between the composite cost of capital of the PF and the sponsor’s, and the sponsor’s overall cost of 
capital after the CB. 
We thus want to determine what affects the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF 
and SDF transactions. Additionally, and given the fact that the credit spread between AS bonds and PF 
loans is statistically and significantly different at the 5% level or higher we have also studied the 
probability of a new sponsor choosing to structure a new loan as a PF or AS. Similarly, and given the fact 
that AS bonds and CB have similar characteristics as they are both issued in capital markets, we also 
studied the main factors affecting the probability of a new borrower’s choice between AS and CB issues. 
Moreover, as described in section 3, our sample includes SF loans and bonds, as well as SDF 
bonds signed/issued by borrowers in Western Europe over the years 2000-2011. Given that during this 
period of time we experienced two crises – (i) the early 2000 recession, which affected the European 
Union mostly during 2000 and 2001, (ii) and the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis which has been affecting Western European countries since 2008 – we cannot rule 
out that a flight to quality might have left many borrowers in these countries credit-rationed. As a result, 
the probability of observing SF deals with relevant pricing information (i.e., our sample selection) might 
not be random but rather somewhat determined by the same risk characteristics that enter our pricing 
regressions. Therefore, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979). We perform a 
maximum likelihood estimation on our credit spread samples of our model specification, simultaneously 
with a probit selection equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either 
micro and macro variables. 
4.1. Determinants of the Financing Choice 
As stated in the introduction, choosing between SF and SDF includes a decision related to the 
firm’s cost of capital, because an increase in leverage increases the required cost of capital. This is the 
case as SF typically refers to the transfer of a subset of a company’s assets (an ‘activity’) into a 
bankruptcy-remote corporation or other special purpose vehicle or entity (SPV/SPE); i.e., the assets 
instrumental to managing the project are separated from the remaining assets of the parties that create the 
vehicle. Therefore, the factors affecting the differences in credit spread for SF and SDF transactions also 
affect the financing choice. 
The academic literature contains numerous loan pricing studies, both theoretical and empirical. 
Next we review the most prominent ones. Concerning PF loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find 
that PF loan spreads are directly related to variables such as country risk, the use of covenants in the loan 
contract, and project leverage. In their paper, they conclude that a third-party guarantee significantly 
reduces PF loan spreads, while PF loan pricing is not a positive function of maturity and loan size. Sorge 
and Gadanecz (2008) detect that whereas credit spreads for both investment-grade and speculative-grade 
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bonds other than PF are a positive linear function of maturity, in PF loans the term structure of credit 
spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. Blanc-Brude and Strande (2007) argue that: (i) maturity, which is a major 
systematic driver of the cost of debt in standard corporate finance, has a marginal effect on Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs); (ii) tranche size is not a driver in PPPs; and (iii) when risks other than systematic 
risks are not managed through contracts and project design, debt spreads reflect the unallocated portion of 
risk. Corielli et al. (2010) point out that (i) effective ring fencing via nonfinancial contracts causes a drop 
in the credit spread charged; (ii) a project located in a country with higher rating pays lowers credit 
spreads; and (iii) industrial sectors do not influence the level of credit spread. Esty and Megginson (2000, 
2003) show a positive relation between syndicate size (and concentration) and loan pricing. On the 
contrary, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) report that the presence of 
larger syndicates reduces credit spreads. Finally, Gatti et al. (2013) show that certification can create 
economic value by reducing loan spreads. 
Virtually all of the empirical studies on CB credit spreads have found credit ratings to be one of 
its most important determinants. Some of the more recent papers include Duffie and Singleton (1999), 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001), Hull et al. (2004), and Gabbi and Sironi (2005). In 
searching for determinants of CB credit spreads, researchers also found other factors to be important, like 
liquidity, systematic risk, incomplete accounting information, and taxes. An important stream of the 
literature analyzes the relationship between spread and maturity. Several authors [e.g., Jones et al. (1984), 
Sarig and Warga (1989), Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008)] argue that on 
average, the term structure of credit spreads for investment grade bonds appears upward-sloping. 
However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term structure of credit spreads for non-
investment grade bonds [e.g., Fons (1987), Sarig and Warga (1989), and Helwege and Turner (1999)]. 
Referring to AS bond credit spreads, Rothberg et al. (1989) argue that liquidity and credit risk 
significantly affect the pricing of pass-through securities. Maris and Segal (2002) study the determinants 
of credit spread on CMBS and find that (i) default probability, (ii) tranche size, (iii) transaction size, and 
(iv) year influence CMBS credit spreads. Ammer and Clinton (2004) find that rating downgrades are 
accompanied by negative returns and widening spreads. Firla-Cuchra (2005) argues that credit rating is 
the most important pricing factor for this asset class at issue. This idea is corroborated by Gorton and 
Souleles (2005), Hu and Cantor (2006), and Vink and Thibeault (2008). 
Pinto et al. (2013) analyze loan and bond pricing factors and conclude that several pricing factors 
apply for both SF and SDF transactions. The relevant factors found in the loan pricing analysis are: (i) the 
tranche size, the loan to value ratio, the number of banks, and currency risk– microeconomic variables; 
and (ii) financial crisis and the slope of the Euro area yield curve – macroeconomic variables. 
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All the aforementioned pricing factors should also be important in the financing choice. 
Therefore, in influencing the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, we consider the fourteen 
variables presented in Table 5, which gives an overview of the variables and their expected impact on the 
sponsor financing choice. With respect to the influence of the individual determinants, the sample 
characteristics presented in Table 4 convey the impression that, when compared to CB, SF tranches are on 
average larger for AS bonds and smaller for PF loans. On average, we expect that SF tranches are smaller 
than SDF tranches since tranching (issuance of multiple debt security classes) and the consequent risk 
dispersion is often cited as one of the major SF benefits. Also, loans exposed to currency risk are more 
likely to be prepared as SDF transactions. Conversely, loans with longer maturity and issued with a third-
party guarantee are more likely to be structured as SF. Comparing PF loans with AS bonds, we expect 
that if a sponsor would like to obtain funding for a longer period of time, he will choose to issue securities 
backed by receivables, rather than structuring a PF transaction. 
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
With respect to the sector or business group, PF is most commonly used for capital-intensive 
ventures – such as power plants, refineries, toll roads, pipelines, telecommunications facilities, and 
industrial plants – with relatively transparent cash flows. Thus, we expect that borrowers belonging to 
industrial, utilities, and transportation industries are more likely to use PF loans. Moreover, and given the 
importance of the PPPs in Western Europe – PPPs reduce the need for government borrowing, shift part 
of the risks presented by the project to the private sector, and aim at achieving more effective 
management of the project –, we also expect that government and public sector entities rely on PF as an 
important form of allowing a project to proceed without being a direct burden on the government’s 
budget. AS is the process whereby financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and 
converted into negotiable securities to be placed into the market. The major issuers of AS bonds are 
companies belonging to commercial and financial industries, with particular emphasis on banks – 
securitization technique allows the transformation of heterogeneous assets that are mostly not negotiable 
by banks into liquid and homogenous securities, suitable for trade. With respect to CB, issues are also 
highly concentrated in the financial industry (67.2% of the total value and 80.8% of the total number) – 
see Table 2. Thus, we expect that financial institutions are more likely to use AS and CB issues. 
There is broad consensus that SF, more specifically AS, played an important role in the 
development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Thus, transactions developed during the 
crisis period are more likely to be arranged as SDF transactions. However, transactions were more likely 
to be structured as PF, rather than AS during that period. 
The general level of interest rates (risk free rate), the slope of the Euro swap curve (a proxy of the 
expectations about the future evolution of interest rates), and the market volatility seem to support the use 
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of SF. Finally, an improvement in credit conditions, and therefore of credit accessibility by borrowers, 
will increase the usage of either SF or SDF. Thus, we cannot clearly determine the impact of credit 
accessibility on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. 
In order to test these expected impacts, a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979), 
has been designed. This methodology and the underlying sample for the empirical analysis are presented 
in the following section. Although the fourteen micro and macro independent variables are self-
explanatory, the dependent variable requires definition. The credit spread corresponds to the price for the 
risk associated with the financing instrument, on the basis of available information, at the time of issue. 
For PF loans, the credit spread represents the spread paid by the borrower over 3-month Euribor or 3-
month Libor. For bonds, the spread is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue above a 
corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. None of these measures are 
perfect proxies for the credit risk associated with loans and bonds. In particular, the spread over Euribor 
or Libor does not represent the full economic cost of credit. Loans and bonds also carry fees that can be 
related to creditworthiness and performance. The comparability of our pricing variables across loans and 
bonds is improved by making the following adjustment. While in PF loans the benchmark priced off 
Euribor or Libor is a three-month interbank rate, bonds typically carry a spread over a benchmark 
government security (e.g., German Treasury Bonds). Therefore, there is a difference between the two 
benchmarks represented by different credit risk levels involving unsecured short-term bank risk and a 
risk-free government rate. Following the approach of Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008), we adjust for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks by adding to the Euribor or 
Libor spread of the PF loans the difference between the three-month Euro Libor and the three-month 




In order to test the expected impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF 
over AS, or AS over CB, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979). We perform 
maximum likelihood estimations on our credit spread samples of our model specification simultaneously 
with a probit selection equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either 
micro and macro variables. 
We have observed credit spread when a loan is an SF loan or bond versus an SDF bond (or a PF 
loan versus an AS bond or an AS bond versus a CB). Then we fit a binomial probit model that predicts 
the loan’s probability of being arranged as an SF transaction. In this circumstance, si – the selection 
                                                 
35
 The average difference is 31 basis points and has a standard deviation of 44 basis points during our sample period. 
Additionally, as loans are priced over a three month rate while bonds tend to be priced off longer-term benchmarks, 
we include as additional control in our regression analysis the slope of the Euro swap curve as the difference 
between the 5 year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor at the time of the signing of the loan or issuing the bonds. 
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indicator – is set to zero or one on the factors underlying that decision. Thus, the selection indicator which 
is analyzed here is of a binary format: 1 for SF (or PF or AS), 0 for SDF (or AS or CB), whether the issue 
is presented in the analysis or not. The Heckman selection model assumes that there exists an underlying 
regression relationship, 
(1) 
The dependent variable, however, is not always observed. Rather, the dependent variable for 






Equation 1 is the determination equation or outcome equation and equation 2 is the selection 
equation. When ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to the first equation yield biased results. 
Heckman provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters in such models.
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The I(·) function equals 1 if the argument is true – if the loan is an SF transaction – and zero 
otherwise. We observe yi if si = 1. The selection function (2) contains a set of explanatory factors Z, which 
must be a superset of X; i.e., for us to identify the model, Z should contain at least one variable that is not 
in the outcome equation. The error either in equation 1 and equation 2, u and v, respectively, are assumed 
to have a zero-conditional mean: E[Xu] = 0 and E[Zv] = 0. 
The Heckman (1979) selection model is driven by the notion that some of the Z factors for a loan 
are different from the factors in X. For example, whether a sponsor belongs or not to the financial 
institution industry is likely to influence whether a borrower chooses an SF transaction but might be 
omitted from credit spread determination equation: it appears in Z but not in X. Other factors are likely to 
appear in both equations. For example, the tranche size and whether the loan is arranged during the crisis 
period will likely influence the borrower decision to choose an SF transaction as well as the credit spread 
that will be paid in that transaction. 





                                                 
36














































We use a full maximum-likelihood procedure to jointly estimate β, γ, and ρ. The model is fitted 
over the entire sample and gives an estimate of the crucial correlation ρ – the correlation of u and v –, 
along with a test or the hypothesis that ρ = 0. The rejection of this hypothesis means that an OLS 
estimation of equation 1 will produce inconsistent estimates of β. When running our model we adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). We can thus 
obtain robust standard errors for our credit spread model.  
The above described methodology is used to analyze a sample of 599 AS issues, 20,977 CB 
issues, and 2,859 PF issues. From this entire sample, we have available information on credit spread 
(high-information samples) for a total of 1,090 PF loans, 439 AS bonds, and 10,551 CB issues. The 
results of this estimation are presented in the following section. 
4.3. Results 
Results are reported in Table 6 for three models: model [1] – SF loans and bonds versus SDF 
bonds –, model [2] – PF loans versus AS bonds –, and model [3] – AS bonds versus SDF bonds (or CB). 
We identified several microeconomic and macroeconomic factors as significant determinants of choosing 
each of the analyzed financial instruments. The reported model chi2 test is a Wald test where all 
coefficients in the regression model (except the constant) are 0. We clearly reject the null hypothesis. 
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
We start our analysis by looking at the estimation of the determination equation in model [1], in 
which we regress credit spread against micro and macro variables for a sample that simultaneously 
includes PF loans and AS bonds. The coefficients of maturity, country risk, risk free rate, volatility, and 
U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable are statistically insignificant. The natural log of the tranche size 
negatively influences the credit spread. This suggests that increasing the tranche size by 100 M€ will 
reduce the required credit spread by 101.53 bps. Similarly, the slope of the Euro swap curve (EUSA5y-
Libor3M) is significantly and negatively related to credit spread. The loan to value ratio, the number of 
banks, and the currency risk and crisis dummy variables are significantly and positively related with 
credit spread. 
Comparing the results obtained in estimating the determination equation for models [2] and [3], 
we conclude that the regression intercepts for each type of loan issue show the highest credit spread for 
























differently for PF loans than for AS bonds. Whereas spread and loan to value are significantly, positively 
related for PF loans, they have a significant negative relationship for AS bonds. These results are in line 
with the expected coefficient sign for PF and AS issues. AS bonds demonstrate a larger coefficient 
compared to PF loans, which means that lenders associate an increase in the loan to value ratio with a 
significant reduction of credit risk for these types of securities. Similarly, the variable number of banks 
behaves differently for PF loans as compared with AS bonds. Whereas credit spread and number of banks 
are significantly and positively related for PF loans, they have a significantly negative relationship for AS 
issues. The need for a higher number of banks in arranging a PF transaction can possibly be associated 
with an increase in risk and thus an extra premium is demanded. For AS issues, a larger number of banks 
involved is able to lower the spread once investors associate a larger number of banks with an increase in 
the certification of the transaction. Finally, a transaction with the issue date or active date belonging to the 
crisis period will have a higher average credit spread of 178.77 bps, and 113.87 bps for PF, and AS 
issues, respectively. 
Next, we will analyze the signs and magnitude of the coefficients obtained for the explanatory 
factors Z in our selection equations. With respect to model [1], borrowers chose an SF transaction when 
they seek long-term financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk. Similarly, 
borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase the likelihood of an SF 
transaction. On the contrary, the probability of observing an SF transaction decreases with the tranche 
size and currency risk. Several macroeconomic factors significantly determine the selection of an SF 
transaction. Among these, risk free rate, volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M), 
and credit accessibility influence positively the probability of observing an SF loan or bond over an SDF 
bond. As expected, the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of observing an SF loan or 
bond. Somewhat counter intuitively, the financial institutions’ dummy variable is found to decrease the 
likelihood of a borrower/issuer choosing an SF transaction. However, this can be explained by the fact 
that from the total number of uncensored observations the major part belongs to PF loans, where financial 
institutions are the lenders and not the borrowers/issuers. Our findings are in line with the expected 
impact of micro and macro factors in the financing decision between SF and SDF – see Table 5. 
Considering the choice between PF and AS, the following (macro) factors do not influence the 
decision: volatility, credit accessibility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M). For 
these factors, the expected sign of coefficients was not possible to determine clearly. As expected, for all 
sector dummy variables, with the exception of the financial institutions, the coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of the financial institutions dummy variable is negative and 
significant, which means that sponsors belonging to the financial institution industry are less likely to use 
PF loans; i.e., are more likely to use securitization as a funding instrument. The country risk rating is 
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positive and significant at the 5% level. This leads to the conclusion that a sponsor located in a risky 
country is more likely to be financed with a PF loan than an AS bond. The same sign can be found for the 
other analyzed macro variables; i.e., crisis and risk free rate. We can thus conclude that the financial 
crisis (as expected) led to a transfer in the form of funding based on SF transactions, increasing the use of 
PF and reducing the use of AS. The negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk dummy 
variable indicates that in the case of currency risk AS is preferred. Finally, sponsors prefer AS bonds for 
larger tranches and funding with a higher time to maturity. Again, these findings are in line with the 
expected impact on the choice of PF over AS. 
The regression results for model [3] reveal that the tranche size and industrial, utilities, financial 
institutions, and transportation dummy variables do not have an influence on the financing choice 
between AS and CB. AS is chosen when issuers seek longer-term sources of funding, are established in 
riskier countries and bonds face currency risk. As expected, risk free rate, volatility, and EUSA5y-
Libor3M positively influence the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB. Again, and due to the 
relevant role played by securitization in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, the crisis dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. Finally, the unique sector 
with a significant impact on the probability of observing an AS instead of a CB issue is government; i.e., 
issuers in government industry decrease the likelihood of observing an AS transaction. 
In models [1] and [3] the likelihood-ratio test for ρ = 0 – Wald test (rho=0) – lead us to accept the 
hypothesis of equations (3) and (4) above being independent. On the contrary, we reject this hypothesis 
for model [2], pointing out the presence of selection bias. However, we have re-estimated the models 
controlling for this selection bias and they don’t yield results fundamentally different; i.e., the sign and 
significance of variables remain the same. 
Table 5 summarizes our findings, providing an overview of the variables, their expected impact 
on the financing choice, and our findings. We find, for example, that: (i) the effect of lower tranche size 
increases the probability of selecting an SF transaction, rather than an SDF transaction – the same takes 
place in the selection process between AS bonds and PF loans; (ii) borrowers chose an SF transaction 
when they are looking for long-term financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk; (iii) 
borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase the likelihood of an SF 
transaction, more specifically a PF transaction, while the probability of observing an AS bond issue 
increases if the borrower belongs to the financial industry – the coefficient of financial institutions for 
model [3] is statistically insignificant because financial institutions use either AS bonds and CB to get 
funding in capital markets; (iv) as expected, the 2007-2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of 
observing an SF transaction, despite the crisis increased the probability of observing a PF loan vis-a-vis 
an AS bond; (v) the level of the interest rates, market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and 
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credit accessibility positively influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond; (vi) market 
volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility proves to be irrelevant in the process 
of the financing decision between PF and AS. 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
As pointed out, several authors argue that credit rating is the most important pricing factor for AS 
bonds at issue [e.g., Rothberg et al. (1989), Maris and Segal (2002), Firla-Cuchra (2005), Gorton and 
Souleles (2005), Hu and Cantor (2006), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and Pinto et al. (2013)]. Therefore, in 
order to ensure that our estimates are unbiased, we re-estimated model [3] by augmenting the initial 
specifications of the determination equation with rating variable.
37
 We start our analysis by looking at the 
estimation of the determination equation in model [4], in which we regress credit spread against micro 
and macro variables for a sample that includes 364 AS bonds.
38
 We have not re-estimated models [1] and 
[2] because it is difficult to obtain credit risk information for PF loans – there are only 39 PF loans with 
available information on credit rating. This is because the information about the credit rating for PF loans 
at closing date provided by DealScan is scant when compared with the credit rating information provided 
by DCM Analytics database for AS and CB issues. 
Table 7 shows exactly the results expected; i.e., the higher the credit risk of the issuer the higher 
the credit spread. Comparing the results obtained in estimating the determination equation for models [3] 
and [4], we conclude that the coefficients on log loan to value and on number of banks and U.K. 
borrowers dummy variables become insignificant, while crisis dummy variable remains significantly and 
positively related to credit spread. Our findings are in line with both theoretical and empirical studies, 
which present the excessive reliance on asset securitization credit ratings as one of the causes of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis [e.g., Tavakoli (2008), Gennaioli et al. (2010), and Mishkin (2010)]. The increasing 
complexity of the securitization market and the ever growing range of products being made available to 
investors created challenges in terms of efficient information assembly and an excessive reliance of 
investors on credit ratings. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
The regression results for model [4] reveal that the signs and magnitude of the coefficients 
obtained for the explanatory factors Z in our selection equation are largely consistent with the original 
version. Only one difference in significance of the coefficients can be pointed out: regression results for 
                                                 
37
 Our classification scheme consists of 22 rating scales for two rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and 
Moody’s. Bond ratings are based on the S&P and Moody’s bond rating at issue. If both ratings are available, the 
average rating is calculated and used. This classification scheme follows the approach proposed by Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) and Gatti, et al. (2013). 
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 When estimating model [4] variable volatility was omitted because of collinearity. 
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model [4] reveal that volatility do not have an influence on the financing choice between AS and CB 
when augmenting the initial specifications of the determination equation with a credit risk measure. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis played a significant role in the failure of numerous businesses, 
declines in consumer wealth, and a downturn in economic activity, contributing to the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Since the second half of 2008 we have been observing considerable financial 
turmoil, a flight to quality might have left many investors and intermediaries in the Western European 
countries credit-rationed. Hence, SF borrowers and lenders might have also changed their attitude towards 
SF in terms of pricing and compensation. As an additional robustness check, we examine whether the 
financing choice changes across time, by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to 
September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing 
date) through to December 31
st
, 2011. Therefore, we have re-estimated model [1] considering these two 
periods. The results are reported in Table 8. 
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
Comparing the results obtained in estimating the determination equation for models [5] and [6], 
we find that SF tranches credit spread has increased significantly during the crisis period. The split of our 
SF sample has a considerable impact on the regressions intercept, causing an increase of 572.93 bps 
between pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples. 
Coefficient of country risk, the only statistically significant for the pre-crisis period, become, 
when comparing regression results for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples, insignificant. The coefficients of 
the log tranche size, risk free rate and EUSA5y-Libor3M become significantly, negatively related to credit 
spread. Finally, variables’ log loan to value, and currency risk and U.K. borrowers dummy variables 
become significantly, positively related to credit spread. This might be explained by a liquidity shortfall 
in financial markets. The critical phase of the 2007-2008 financial crisis manifested a shortage of 
liquidity, which was reflected in a fall in asset prices below their long run fundamental price and a 
deterioration in external financing conditions. For example, U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable becomes 
significantly, positively related to SF issue credit spread during the crisis period because the resulting 
liquidity problems (funding liquidity and balance sheet liquidity) vehemently affected U.K. financial 
institutions. Additionally, the significant and negative relationship between the macroeconomic variables 
risk free rate and EUSA5y-Libor3M and credit spread during the crisis period is not a surprise, since from 
late 2009, a sovereign debt crisis developed in Europe as a result of the rising private and government 
debt levels around the world together with a wave of downgrading of government debt in some European 
states. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred to sovereign 
debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government responses to slowing economies post-bubble. 
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Considering the choice between SF and SDF, the results suggest that splitting our sample in pre-
crisis and crisis period does not bias the main conclusions of our analysis. Comparing the results obtained 
in estimating the selection equations for models [5] and [6] we find that the main changes are related with 
macroeconomic factors. Risk free rate, volatility, and EUSA5y-Libor3M positively influence the 
probability of observing an SF transaction in crisis period only. Finally, credit accessibility variable does 
not influence the likelihood of observing an SF transaction in the crisis period. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The paper provides interesting empirical findings for both academics and practitioners. For 
academics, the paper provides evidence consistent with the notion that structured finance (SF) does 
matter, because it affects investment incentives, deadweight financing costs, and asset cash flows. 
Furthermore, the paper also provides results from the empirical testing of a number of predictions based 
on mainstream security design models. For practitioners, the paper provides framework for understanding 
why SF creates value and when to choose it instead of straight debt financing because, as we argue, SF 
reduces financing all-in cost. In particular, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms use SF to reduce costly agency conflicts resulting from creating asset-specific governance solutions 
to mitigate free cash flow problems and prevent opportunistic behavior. Moreover, any transaction which 
is specifically structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing assets producing cash flows solely 
for supporting the transaction, allows the issuer to obtain better credit ratings and/or leverage than it 
would be possible by issuing senior secured debt, because it reduces asymmetric information problems. 
We applied an organizational choice model to SF and straight debt finance (SDF) transactions to 
determine the factors that affect the probability of a new borrower choosing between SF and SDF 
transactions, and even between project finance (PF) loans and asset securitization (AS) bonds or between 
AS bonds and corporate bonds (CB). 
We found that: (i) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they are looking for long-term 
financing and when they operate in a higher risk country; (ii) borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, 
transportation and government showed higher likelihood to choose SF transactions; (iii) the probability of 
observing an SF transaction decreased with the tranche size and currency risk; (iv) several 
macroeconomic factors significantly determined the selection of an SF transaction – among these, the 
level of interest rates, the market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and the credit accessibility 
positively influenced the probability of observing an SF loan or bond over an SDF bond; and (v) the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, as expected, decreased the probability of observing an SF loan or bond. 
Considering the choice between PF and AS: (i) the coefficients of the industrial, utilities, 
transportation, and government dummy variables were positive; i.e., sponsors belonging to the financial 
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industry were more likely to use securitization as a funding source; (ii) a sponsor located in a country with 
a lower sovereign rating proved more likely to be financed with a PF loan than an AS bond; (iii) the 
financial crisis, as expected, led to a transfer in the form of funding based on SF transactions, increasing 
the use of PF and reducing the use of AS; (iv) the negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk 
dummy variable indicated that in the case of currency risk, AS is preferred; and (v) sponsors preferred AS 
bonds for larger tranches and when they sought funding with a higher time to maturity. 
Finally, with respect to the choice between AS and CB, we concluded that: (i) AS was chosen 
when issuers are looking for longer-term sources of funding, are established in riskier countries and bonds 
face currency risk; (ii) the level of interest rates, the market volatility, and the slope of the Euro swap 
curve, as expected, influenced positively the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB; (iii) the 
unique sector that had a significant impact on the probability of observing an AS instead of a CB issue, 
was government; and (iv) again, and due to the relevant role played by securitization in the development 
and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the crisis dummy variable was significantly negative. 
Our results are in line with security design literature. SF transactions or instruments, based on 
extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with market 
imperfections, namely agency problems and asymmetric information. Accordingly to Diamond (1993), 
Hart and Moore (1995), Winton (1995), Glaeser and Kallal (1997), and Riddiough (1997), in AS the 
design and issuance of different classes of securities with different degrees of seniority – structuring – 
reduces monitoring costs. Our results corroborate these findings, as credit spread and loan to value have a 
significant negative relationship for AS bonds. Similarly, structural features of PF transactions, like 
extensive contracting, concentrated debt and equity ownership, separate legal incorporation, and high 
leverage, reduce costly agency conflicts at the project level. 
We also corroborate Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) results, as borrowers chose an SF vis-
a-vis an SDF transaction when they seek long-term financing. Thus, when the information about the true 
quality of a firm’s assets is asymmetrically distributed between insiders and outsiders, short-term debt 
issues may be perceived by market participants as signaling firm asset quality and borrowers prefer SDF 
transactions. Referring to PF, we conclude that PF is most commonly used for capital-intensive facilities 
and utilities with relatively transparent cash flows, in riskier than average countries, using relatively long-
term financing. Thus, our results corroborate the conclusions of Shah and Thakor (1987), Kensinger and 
Martin (1988), and Esty (2004a, 2004b). Riskier projects should be project-financed because PF can help 
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Table 1: Distribution of the sample of PF, AS, and CB issues by year 
 
 
Table 2: Industrial distribution of PF, AS, and CB issues 
 
 


























2000 84 13,502 4.1 115 26,027 14.5 1,250 341,913 5.9
2001 87 13,061 3.9 81 12,990 7.3 1,138 363,536 6.3
2002 69 13,455 4.1 77 17,709 9.9 1,187 278,418 4.8
2003 124 23,067 6.9 42 14,894 8.3 1,962 376,540 6.5
2004 119 12,292 3.7 66 31,555 17.6 2,477 393,164 6.8
2005 122 18,278 5.5 53 10,034 5.6 2,454 597,527 10.3
2006 131 18,340 5.5 55 10,639 5.9 2,628 691,627 12.0
2007 233 27,204 8.2 35 3,469 1.9 2,819 575,316 9.9
2008 638 60,423 18.2 39 36,122 20.2 1,125 444,552 7.7
2009 376 33,567 10.1 36 15,694 8.8 1,412 797,634 13.8
2010 496 53,187 16.0 - - - 1,337 506,067 8.7
2011 380 45,739 13.8 - - - 1,188 420,238 7.3
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Year

























Commercial 454 35,259 10.6 90 21,750 12.1 1,226 677,251 11.7
Industrial 836 125,993 37.9 33 11,622 6.5 1,802 761,763 13.2
Utilities 1,206 103,214 31.1 27 8,522 4.8 692 355,409 6.1
Financial Institutions 12 4,777 1.4 444 134,457 75.1 16,952 3,887,415 67.2
Transportation 182 45,533 13.7 5 2,782 1.6 261 96,199 1.7
Government 112 8,518 2.6 - - - 7 794 0.0
Other 57 8,819 2.7 - - - 37 7,701 0.1
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Industrial Category 
of Borrower

























Austria 12 2,788 0.8 1 27 0.0 1,442 135,740 2.3
Belgium 61 6,850 2.1 18 1,723 1.0 432 114,076 2.0
Cyprus 7 244 0.1 - - - 15 4,419 0.1
Denmark 11 1,307 0.4 - - - 24 5,000 0.1
Finland 10 4,780 1.4 - - - 115 35,219 0.6
France 229 27,340 8.2 32 1,526 0.9 1,843 855,408 14.8
Germany 160 19,424 5.8 117 47,299 26.4 7,604 1,387,083 24.0
Greece 62 10,874 3.3 2 74 0.0 160 66,692 1.2
Iceland 4 450 0.1 - - - 2 306 0.0
Ireland 74 4,613 1.4 10 3,309 1.8 186 99,279 1.7
Italy 348 28,296 8.5 52 39,314 21.9 1,755 611,264 10.6
Luxemburg 3 311 0.1 3 173 0.1 79 27,127 0.5
Netherlands 83 14,691 4.4 42 4,270 2.4 1,242 465,500 8.0
Norway 29 4,658 1.4 - - - 1 350 0.0
Portugal 198 20,993 6.3 11 1,391 0.8 420 85,015 1.5
Spain 915 93,152 28.0 19 6,228 3.5 1,097 572,038 9.9
Sweden 30 2,144 0.6 - - - 15 4,483 0.1
Switzerland 17 10,769 3.2 - - - 1,709 103,240 1.8
United Kingdom 606 78,429 23.6 292 73,797 41.2 2,836 1,214,293 21.0
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Geographic Location 
of Borrower
Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
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Table 4: Basic characteristics for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues 
 
 
Table 5: Definition of variables, expected impact, and findings 
 
The following characters in Table 5 mean: – = negative impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF 
over AS, or AS over CB | + = positive impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS 




Variable of interest Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
Number of tranches 2,859 599 20,977
Total volume, Euro millions 332,114 179,132 5,786,532
Tranche size, Euro millions
Average 116 299 276
Minimum 0.045 0.050 0.017
Maximum 3,800 22,298 7,763
Average maturity, years 13.6 20.9 5.3
Tranches with guarantee (% ) 96.9 100.0 2.1
Tranches with currency risk (% ) 11.0 31.4 33.2
Tranches to U.K. borrowers (% ) 21.2 48.7 13.5
Tranches to financial institutions (% ) 0.428 74.1 80.8















Log tranche size Natural log of the loan or bond tranche size. Tranche size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
- - + - - I
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. + - + + - +
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans and bonds that are 
denominated in a currency different from the currency in 
the borrower's home country or deal's nationality.
- - - - - +
Industrial Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the industrial sector.
+ + - + + I
Utilities Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the utilities sector.
+ + - + + I
Financial intitutions Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the financial institutions sector.
? - + - - I
Transportation Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the transportation sector.
+ + - + + I
Governement Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the government sector.
+ + - + + -
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is 
converted as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until 
D=22. 
+ + + + + +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis 
period and 0 otherwise.
- + - - + -
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the 
signing of the loan or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the 
general level of interest rates.
+ ? + + + +
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX). VIX reflects a market estimate of future volatility.
+ ? + + I +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the 
difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-
month Libor rate.
+ ? + + I +
Credit accessibility The iTraxx Europe index.  iTraxx is used as a proxy for 
credit conditions and therefore for credit accessibility by 
borrowers.





Table 6: Regression analyses of the probability of observing an SF loan or bond 
 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. **, * indicate 























Maturity 0.386 0.235 -0.493
(0.84) (0.65) (-0.17)


































































































































Number of observations 15,255 1,036 21,416
Censored observations 14,317 269 20,977
Uncensored observations 938 767 439
Lambda -3.424 -14.705 12.377
Wald chi2 test PI-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test (rho=0) PI-value 0.659 0.004 0.846
Log likelihood -7,776.081 -4,735.209 -4,345.866
SF loan or bond (versus SDF 
bond)
PF loan (versus AS bond) AS bond (versus SDF bond)




Table 7: Regression analysis of the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB: the impact of credit 
risk 
 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. **, * indicate 






Log tranche size -7.035 5.477
(-1.62) (1.17)










Country risk -11.168 -8.875
(-0.85) (-0.87)








































































Number of observations 21,416 21,341
Censored observations 20,977 20,977
Uncensored observations 439 364
Lambda 12.377 7.537
Wald chi2 test PI-value 0.000 0.000
Wald test (rho=0) PI-value 0.846 0.972
Log likelihood -4,345.866 -3,577.622
AS bond (versus SDF bond)AS bond (versus SDF bond)




Table 8: Regression analysis of the probability of observing an SF loan or bond: the impact of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis 
 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. **, * indicate 



















Maturity 0.386 3.340 -1.225
(0.84) (1.41) (-1.31)



















Risk free rate -0.099 -0.007 -0.749
**
(-1.45) (-0.05) (-4.67)

































































































Number of observations 15,255 10,585 4,670
Censored observations 14,317 10,013 4,304
Uncensored observations 938 572 366
Lambda -3.424 91.093 -26.223
Wald chi2 test PI-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test (rho=0) PI-value 0.659 0.167 0.067
Log likelihood -7,776.081 -4,659.777 -3,040.970
SF loan or bond (versus SDF 
bond)
SF loan or bond (versus SDF 
bond)
SF loan or bond (versus SDF 
bond)
Structured Finance (SF)
Structured Finance (SF) | 
pre-crisis period
Structured Finance (SF) | 
crisis period
[1] [5] [6]
